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INTRODUCTION
The Earth continues to experience record-breaking
temperatures caused by increased atmospheric concentrations of
carbon dioxide (“CO2”) and other greenhouse gases (“GHGs”).1 The
impacts of this unprecedented warming include increased floods and
drought, rising sea levels, the spread of deadly diseases such as malaria
and dengue fever, and increasing numbers of violent storms and
weather-related catastrophes.2 Climate change presents a challenge to
almost all areas of human economic activity because of our reliance
on GHG-emitting fossil fuels and fossil fuel products.
The current global emissions trajectory has a high probability
of 4.5 degrees of warming above pre-industrial levels with catastrophic
effects.3 Factoring in planned actions under the Paris Agreement4 still
leaves a high probability of reaching 2.7 degrees of increased warmth.5
To keep warming well below 2 degrees and maintain the possibility of
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Dayton, School of Law.
1
U.N. ENV’T PROGRAMME AND WORLD METEOROLOGICAL ORGANIZATION,
INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 2014
SYNTHESIS REPORT 40 (R.K. Pachauri et al. eds.) (2014) [hereinafter IPCC].
2
Id. at 50–53.
3
See CLIMATE ACTION TRACKER, http://climateactiontracker.org/ (last visited
February 6, 2020) (Analyzing and tracking government climate action measured
against the Paris Agreement).
4
The Paris Agreement was adopted as a Decision of the UNFCCC parties
rather than a protocol or a treaty so as to avoid the domestic ratification obligations
of some countries regarding formal international agreements. See United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change Dec. 1/CP.21, U.N. Doc.
FCCC/CP/2015/10/Add.1 (January 29, 2016) (adopting Paris Agreement).
5
See U.N ENV’T PROGRAMME, THE EMISSIONS GAP REPORT 2016 (2016)
(analyzing outcomes of planned actions under Paris Agreement).
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stabilizing at the safe level of 1.5 degrees above pre-industrial levels,
it may be necessary for global emissions to peak by 2020.6 Projections
suggest that, based on past emissions, the Earth is already locked into
a baseline increase in temperature that makes some impacts
unavoidable by 2100.7 None of the associated costs of climate change
between now and 2050 are likely to be avoided because this is lockin.8
For climate change adaptation, the first thing to note are these
locked-in impacts. Necessary adaption entails increasing adaptive
capacity9 in the near term, and thereafter focusing on specific systems
and tools to address region-specific climate impacts.
The
10
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (“IPCC”) analysis of
timing of impacts and mitigation-peaking dates suggests that much of
the initial work for addressing vulnerability11 and resilience,12 even
under the most optimistic scenarios, will have to be carried out almost
immediately in order to be prepared to respond to impacts caused by
the inevitable 1-degree temperature increase that will occur by 2050.13
The urgency of mitigation technology development and
diffusion is determined by when, generally at some point before 2025,
the country will need to peak emissions. This will necessitate major
technological and sector shifts including in vehicular fuel efficiency,
6

IPCC, supra note 1, at 82.
Id. at 78-79.
8
Id.
9
Adaptive capacity is the potential or capability of a system to adapt to
climatic stimuli or their effects or impacts. See INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON
CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 2001: IMPACTS, ADAPTATION AND
VULNERABILITY. CONTRIBUTION OF WORKING GROUP II TO THE THIRD
ASSESSMENT REPORT OF THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE
894 (2001).
10
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) is the
international body for assessing the science related to climate change. See About,
IPCC, https://www.ipcc.ch/about/.
11
Vulnerability is the degree to which a system is susceptible to injury,
damage, or harm (one part—the problematic or detrimental part—of sensitivity).
See CLIMATE CHANGE 2001, supra note 9.
12
Id. at 894.
13
INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE
2014: SYNTHESIS REPORT. CONTRIBUTION OF WORKING GROUPS I, II AND III TO
THE FIFTH ASSESSMENT REPORT OF THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE
CHANGE 51, 60 (2014).
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end-use electric efficiency, coal production efficiency, carbon capture,
and storage, renewable energy, and nuclear energy.14 A cursory glance
at the technologies encompassed by these sectors yield an unwieldy
and large list of specific technologies.15 For example, end-use electric
efficiency encompasses the entirety of the domestic and industrial
appliance sector encompassed by a well-off middle class home in the
globalized economy. Most such appliances, whether televisions,
washing machines or refrigerators, have motors, lighting and sensors
which could be made more efficient, expend heat which can be
reduced or captured, run on software which can be made smarter and
faster; and batteries whose efficiency and storage capacity needs to be
improved by orders of magnitude.16 The scope of necessary action
implies that reform of no single technology or technological subset
will be sufficient; all the identified technology sectors will require
adaptation to achieve the goals.17 These technologies are integral to the
reduction of poverty and the expansion of the middle-class and
developed countries must allow access to all of that technology at low
or free cost if climate change mitigation is to occur at any reasonable
pace, scale and cost.
The adaptation challenge, from sea-level rise to changes in the
hydrological cycle, is quite clear.18 This implies increased fragility and
volatility in ecosystems and habitat niches19 affecting food production,
water access and related health problems as well as increased disaster
recovery costs from climate-related extreme weather events.20 The
majority of people in developing countries live in climate-vulnerable
environments and ecosystems.21 Technology and innovative capacity
INT’L ENERGY AGENCY, ENERGY TECHNOLOGY PERSPECTIVES 2010:
SCENARIOS AND STRATEGIES TO 2050 76 (2010).
15
For a full list of technologies, see Dalindyebo Shabalala, CLIMATE
CHANGE, TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY : O PTIONS
FOR A CTION AT THE UNFCCC 59-70 (2014).
16
See id.
17
INT’L ENERGY AGENCY, ENERGY TECHNOLOGY PERSPECTIVES 2012:
PATHWAYS TO A CLEAN ENERGY SYSTEM 39 (2012).
18
CLIMATE CHANGE 2014, supra note 14, at 51.
19
Id. at 54.
20
Id. at 51-53.
21
See U.N. ENV’T. PROGRAMME (UNEP), TOWARDS A GREEN ECONOMY:
PATHWAYS TO SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT AND POVERTY ERADICATION 19
(2011). See also AHSAN UDDIN AHMED, ET AL., BRIDGE OVER TROUBLED WATERS:
LINKING CLIMATE CHANGE AND DEVELOPMENT 1 (Shardul Agrawala ed., 2005).
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are clearly co-extensive with adaptive capacity.22 From an aggregate
development approach, one of the most important interventions that
can be made in these developing countries to reduce vulnerability,
while laying the groundwork for increasing adaptive capacity, are ones
that increase economic growth as quickly as possible in as sustainable
and equitable a manner as possible.23 Adaptation presents a complex
challenge involving a network of existing capacity and vulnerability,
with impacts and adaptations to impacts taking place within a network
of co-factors such as poverty, population shifts and migration patterns,
land use and land use changes.24 The Stern report suggested that the
key areas are: economic wealth generally; infrastructure and
technology; information, knowledge and skills. 25 These are precisely
those areas that can be best addressed by ensuring technology transfer.
Developing countries are also significantly dependent (up to 64%
participation in South Asia and sub-Saharan Africa) on agriculture for
economic growth and thus more sensitive to climate variability.26 A
stable and sustainably growing framework for agricultural production
and distribution is a necessity for reducing vulnerability and enabling
adaptive capacity in developing countries.27 Health interventions to
deal with chronic diseases (both communicable and noncommunicable) in developing countries are also a necessity to reduce
vulnerability and enable adaptive capacity.28 This implicates both
general health infrastructure, and health management systems, but also
as well as the opportunity costs associated with prices of medical
products, devices and services. From this view, the adaptation
See also G. McGranahan et al., The rising tide: assessing the risks of climate
change and human settlements in low elevation coastal zones, 19 ENVIRONMENT
AND URBANIZATION 17, 17 (2007).
22
INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE
2007 –
IMPACTS, ADAPTATION AND VULNERABILITY 727 (2007).
23
WORLD BANK, WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2010: DEVELOPMENT AND
CLIMATE CHANGE 12 (2010). See also UNEP, supra note 21, at 39. See also
NICHOLAS STERN, THE ECONOMICS OF CLIMATE CHANGE: THE STERN REVIEW 12
(Nicholas Stern ed., 2007). See PAUL BAER, ET AL., THE RIGHT TO DEVELOPMENT
IN A CLIMATE CONSTRAINED WORLD 26 (Barbara Unmubig et al. eds., 2008).
24
AHMED ET AL., supra note 21, at 4.
25
STERN, supra note 23, at 94.
26
UNEP, supra note 21, at 38. See also STERN, supra note 23, at 95.
27
UNEP, supra note 21, at 38-40.
28
Id. at 208-09.

2020]

CLIMATE CHANGE, TECH TRANSFER, AND IP

5

challenge is essentially a development challenge29 and thus covers all
sectors of technology relevant to ensuring rapid, non-fossil fuel
dependent economic development. Again, the scope of technologies
implied is economy wide.
In the face of these challenges, what should the policy response
be? Putting political realities aside, what workable solutions are
available to address the basic problem of technology development and
diffusion? This article argues that we should focus on two things:
favoring business and licensing models that take high volume/low cost
approaches to technology by removing regulatory barriers and
transaction costs to engaging in large scale licensing and diffusion of
technology; and acknowledging the urgency of the climate deadline by
providing a temporary moratorium within the international intellectual
property enforcement framework to allow for some breathing space.
The next section discusses some of the basic, necessary elements that
any such proposed solutions should have.
I.

NECESSARY ELEMENTS OF ANY PROPOSED SOLUTION

Purely fiscal transfers are unlikely to address the problem of
climate change and technology transfer. Large scale monetary
transfers to developing countries are out of the question both as a
political and a practical matter. There are basic problems of
governance endemic in many developing countries, related to a lack of
capacity, rampant corruption and insufficient regulatory oversight.30
While many of these problems may be susceptible to policy changes
in the short term, others, such as lack of governance capacity, require
long term solutions. This suggests that urgent near-term action should
focus on simple interventions that provide clear rules and signals to
private sector actors to carry out their activities instead of expecting
developing country governments to develop sophisticated enabling
environments or developed country actors to raise taxes and engage in
direct financial transfers. This is especially crucial for opening up and
increasing access to existing technologies in the 2025 timeframe.31
29

See STERN, supra note 23, at 430. See also AHMED ET AL., supra note

21, at 1.
30

STERN, supra note 23, at 438.
LENNY BERNSTEIN ET AL., INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE
CHANGE (IPCC), CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: SYNTHESIS REPORT 67 (2007).
31
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The scale of financial support necessary to enable developing
countries to address climate change is daunting and contributes to the
failure of the basic bargain in climate negotiations. Under the basic
bargain at the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change, developed countries are supposed to provide financial support
so that developing countries can choose to take an alternative nonGHG emitting development path. The extent of public funding
available, however, may not be anything close to what is actually
required to address the full scope of action needed to develop, deploy
and diffuse technologies. Looking at just one conservative mitigation
scenario, the IEA projected that between 2010 and 2020, over USD
2.3 trillion annually would need to be invested, the majority of which
would be private flows.32 The share of developing countries is USD
1.3 trillion annually, of which China represented USD 500 billion. In
contrast to the scale of the projected need, total investment flows in
2010 and 2011 were USD 247 billion and 260 billion, respectively.
Within the climate negotiations, developed countries in
Copenhagen at COP 15 committed to provide USD 200 billion
annually by 2020 in investment (from a wide variety of sources,
including public funds).33 A significant portion was meant to flow
through the Green Climate Fund (“GCF”), which implies direct cash
or other instruments under the control of the fund, rather than financial
instruments operating outside of the remit of the GCF. The IEA
estimated that climate mitigation related flows from developed to
developing countries amounted to somewhere between USD 70 and
USD 119 billion a year.34 The majority of this was private flows (USD
37 – 72 billion), and the public funds (through bilateral and multilateral
mechanisms) amounted to a potential maximum of USD 43 billion.
Olbrisch et al. reviewed the range of estimates for incremental
investment in the literature noting significant variations for 2030
projections for annual financing needs in developing countries: from

32

See KEVIN BREEN, ET AL., ENERGY TECHNOLOGY PERSPECTIVES
2012: PATHWAYS TO A CLEAN ENERGY SYSTEM 139 tbl. 4.3 (Marilyn Smith
et al. eds., IEA 2012).
33
See Britt Childs Staley et al., Tick Tech Tick Tech: Coming to
Agreement on Technology in the Countdown to Copenhagen 13 (World
Resources Institute Working Paper), Washington DC, June 2009.
34
INT’L ENERGY AGENCY, ENERGY TECHNOLOGY PERSPECTIVES 2012:
PATHWAYS TO A CLEAN ENERGY SYSTEM 152 (IEA/OECD 2012).
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USD 175 billion to USD 565 billion per annum.35 They do not provide
estimates of the portion that would be from private flows, but their
estimate of current funding suggests that private flows are the largest
proportion of funding amounting to at least USD 65 billion per year.
In terms of direct support, it is unlikely that existing and future
public funds will suffice to meet the need in developing countries,36
and, as the IEA notes, they will have to also mobilize a significant
amount of finance domestically.37 This is all before funding for
adaptation is taken into account, which under the GCF should take up
half of the planned disbursements. The IEA and others have had
difficulty finding an argument that investment flows for climate will
differ in any significant way from existing patterns of investment into
developing countries.38 The prescriptions for providing a proper
enabling environment replicate the same tried and true axioms of: 1)
reducing regulatory uncertainty; 2) enabling policies for competitive,
open markets and greening infrastructure investment; 3) implementing
market-based and regulatory policies to “put a price on carbon” and
correct for environmental externalities; 4) incentivizing for innovation
and investment; and 5) adopting financial policies and instruments to
attract private sector participation. Other than a broader faith that these
interventions will work, there is little analysis of how these
recommendations will shift the risk and investment calculus in
economies that are not already attractive investment destinations (for
primarily foreign capital) as a broader matter.
While attractive regulatory and market environments are
clearly necessary conditions, they may not be sufficient to mobilize
foreign investment at the scale required in markets that simply do not
present a sufficient rate of return and may present, even at their best,
more risk than the potential worth of returns. The policy prescription
35

See Susanne Olbrisch et al., Estimates of incremental investment for
and cost of mitigation measures in developing countries, 11 CLIMATE POLICY
970, 974 (2011).
36
See Alex Bowen, Raising Climate Finance to Support Developing
Country Action: Some Economic Considerations, 11 CLIMATE POLICY 1020,
1033 (2011).
37
INTERNATIONAL ENERGY AGENCY, ENERGY TECHNOLOGY
PERSPECTIVES 2012: PATHWAYS TO A CLEAN ENERGY SYSTEM 152 (2012).
38
See Norbert Nziramasanga, Implementing NAMAs Under a New Climate
Agreement that Supports Development in Southern Africa, in ELEMENTS OF A NEW
CLIMATE AGREEMENT BY 2015 93 (Karen A. Olsen et al. eds., 2013).
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here essentially tells developing countries to transform their
economies as a necessary condition for being able to transform their
economies, without any of the necessary financial and technological
support for doing so. These policy transformations are meant to
substitute for direct financial support, and, hopefully, make it possible
for private sector money to flow. How that presents a different, new or
additional solution to the broader development challenge is not
explained. In order to develop, developing countries must therefore
‘develop’ and where they do so, this will obviate the need for
significant public money and support.
In the end, the vast majority of financing and transfer will have
to come from private sector action. Developed countries hope that the
financial shortfall will somehow be made up by private sector actors,
as long as markets are created, and regulatory incentives are put in
place. However, where there is insufficient public finance to provide
support to developing country actors and firms in accessing
technology hardware and knowledge, a reliance on private finance
leaves the additional costs of accessing knowledge in the hands of
developing country firms and institutions. The only way therefore for
developing countries to respond is to take regulatory action to
restructure the market in knowledge and knowledge products so that
the costs of action are borne by developed country actors, which leads
us back to interventions aimed at regulating prices of products, and
regulations aimed at regulating prices for accessing knowledge. This
is why intellectual property intervention continues to be a major
structural issue at the core of the climate change negotiations: there is
not enough money, even where there is political will, to provide all the
financial support that developing countries need to take action to
address climate change mitigation and action.
The recommendation for how developing countries need to
transform their economies to become more open to investment, have
better more predictable legal structures, be more open to trade, provide
more room for the private sector, reflects the long running and ongoing
debate on the ways in which developing countries should best ensure
their broader economic development.39 To a significant extent, these
are exactly the same policy prescriptions that have been given to
developing countries by multilateral financing and development
39

See generally ETHAN HELPMAN, THE MYSTERY OF ECONOMIC
GROWTH (2004).
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institutions for much of the past 3 three decades. It is an ongoing
debate about which economic model is best suited to ensure
development and reflects the broader development challenge for
developing countries. In that sense, it is only realistic to realize that
climate change is indeed congruent with the broader development
challenge. The paucity of direct public funding for climate change
essentially throws developing countries back into the broader set of
policy choices regarding how best to ensure economic development
more broadly. Therefore we need a regulatory approach that creates
markets and reduces transaction costs and uncertainty while NOT
relying on developing countries themselves to do so. More
importantly, we need to consider radical action that removes the basic
friction that intellectual property places on the dissemination and
distribution of technological products and know-how.
Most major emerging economies provide intellectual property
protection that, for the moment, is sufficiently compliant with the
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
(“TRIPS”) and, in comparison to the pre-TRIPS era, provides a stable
and relatively predictable environment for economic transactions to
take place in the context of a broader enabling environment for
investment. There remain concerns about sovereign risks, both policy
and macro-economic,40 related to sudden shifts in government policy
or the extent to which government mandates require non-voluntary
sharing of technologies, especially in China, but that risk appears to be
largely mitigated by the broader attractiveness of doing business in
China. Nevertheless, such risk perceptions may limit the quality and
volume of technologies licensed or made available to enterprises in
these countries. There is some evidence that what is made available
under many licensing or joint venture agreements in these countries is
not best available technology.41
India and China may also play a role as developers and adapters
of technologies that may be better suited to demands in other
developing countries. For example, in the area of modern heat access
(e.g. switching from low efficiency biomass, to efficient gas and solar
INT’L ENERGY AGENCY, ENERGY TECHNOLOGY PERSPECTIVES 2010:
SCENARIOS AND STRATEGIES TO 2050 585 (2010).
41
Kamal Saggis, Trade, Foreign Direct Investment, and International
Technology Transfer: A Survey, WORLD BANK POLICY RESEARCH WORKING PAPER
SERIES 1, 40 (2000).
40
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cookers) rural and peri-urban populations in India and China provide
ideal testing grounds for development and dissemination of such
technologies and Indian and Chinese companies can themselves sell
and transfer these technologies to other developing countries.42
Private sector actors in OECD countries may not be interested in
developing such products as there may be no significant domestic
demand in their own countries, and technological solutions they
propose may not be suited for deployment in difficult economic and
institutional environments of many developing countries. In the
electricity sector, another example is the growth in overall exports
(13% – 45% from 2003 – 2009) from China’s Shanghai Power
Corporation of SC technologies for coal-powered electricity
generation primarily due to exports to developing countries.43
India and China may be the clearest evidence of significant
patenting of clean technologies.44 However, they are also the
developing countries that are most likely to pay reasonable market
rates for licensing of technologies, which has been the case for a
significant number of successful ventures, such as Goldwind and
Suzlon.45 The problem that these countries face involve accessing
licenses for existing technologies from potential competitors in
industrialized countries. They face issues, such as refusals to license,
paying above market rates for technology or restrictive licensing
practices, especially for best available technologies which present the
cutting edge and may be a competitive advantage in industrialized
country markets. They also urgently want to participate in new and
innovative research on clean technology and generate leading
companies that are IP holders themselves.
India and China can address these issues by using existing tools
in the international IP system. Compulsory licensing, or the threat of
42

DAVID ELZINGA, INTERNATIONAL ENERGY AGENCY ET. AL., ADVANTAGE
ENERGY: EMERGING ECONOMIES, DEVELOPING COUNTRIES AND THE PRIVATEPUBLIC SECTOR INTERFACE 25-26 (Int’l Energy Agency 2011).
45
Id. at 38 (citing Tan & Gang, An Emerging Revolution: Clean
Technology Research, Development and Innovation in China, World
Resources Institute (WRI) Working Paper (2009)).
44
Copenhagen Economics and The IPR Company, Are IPR a Barrier
to the Transfer of Climate Change Technology?, at 18 (Jan. 19, 2009),
available at
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2009/february/tradoc_142371.pdf.
45
INT’L ENERGY AGENCY, supra note 40, at 575.
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it, may be available to address anti-competitive practices, such as
refusals to license, unreasonable pricing or restrictive licenses.
Additionally, easier and more transparent licensing platforms and
markets may assist them. In terms of participating in new technologies,
these countries would benefit from more joint research and
development projects, both co-funded and multilaterally funded.
Suggestions for: subsidies; joint R&D; insurance and loan guarantees
for development, diffusion and transfer of climate technology;
infrastructure for information sharing and licensing platforms, global
patent pools, access to publicly funded research; as well as full use of
TRIPS flexibilities reflect these concerns.46 In a sense, it is the
creation of a transparent and equal playing field for licensing of
technologies that is their most urgent need as they generally have
sufficient domestic production capacity. However, emerging
economies are also the most likely to take on quantified emissions
reductions obligations under the Paris Agreement framework and thus
have a fundamental need for access to existing technologies to help
them make the transition out of technologies in which they have
significant sunk costs. This means that they are concerned with
technologies that make existing energy-use less GHG intensive, such
as ‘clean-coal' technologies, and carbon capture and sequestration. In
this sense, the issues they face bear some similarity to the needs of
smaller developing countries, in terms of access to existing
technologies. The least developed countries (“LDCs”) and other
developing countries face a calculus that has only some parallels to the
access to medicines issue: there is an urgent need for access to existing
products at low prices that will maintain and increase energy access.
In general, these countries have little capacity for production and
innovation of complex clean technology, and they do not have the
funds to purchase goods in quantities necessary. They are also the ones
in the least need of mitigation technologies, to the extent that they have
no GHG emission reduction obligations, and they have comparatively
low levels of fossil fuel energy consumption. Their mitigation
46

See, e.g., U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change, Ad Hoc
Working Group on Long-Term Coop. Action Under the Convention, Bonn,
Ger., Mar. 29-Apr. 8, 2009, China’s Views on the Fulfillment of the Bali
Action Plan and the Components of the Agreed Outcome to be Adopted by
the Conference of the Parties at its 15th Session, at 5 (Feb. 6, 2009),
available at
http://unfccc.int/files/kyoto_protocol/application/pdf/china060209.pdf.
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technology need is largely related to access to existing technology
products, and the adaptation of low-level technologies to local
conditions.
The evidence suggests that most mitigation technologies are
not patented or otherwise IP protected in these countries.47 However,
the countries from which LDCs and other developing countries tend to
purchase low cost technology products, especially China and India,
may be increasingly unable to provide these if they cannot access
licenses for technologies that allow them to export. China, Brazil and
India tend to be in the best position to provide low cost mitigation
technologies to other developing countries because their companies
are better placed and more willing to establish production centers and
distribution systems in economies that are less interesting, or too risky
for companies from industrialized countries. LDCs and other
developing countries generally have too little purchasing power for
most companies in industrialized economies to establish production
centers or distribution networks. The emerging economies can fill this
gap but only if they can become production and distribution centers
themselves, and that will occur through access to licensing. Thus,
LDCs and other developing countries have an interest in seeing further
research and development (“R&D”) and access to patent licensing for
emerging economies, but only to the extent that the technologies
licensed are relevant to their needs. South-South flows of renewable
energy technology are at a very low level, the lowest among the four
south-north vectors of flows.48 However, these have been increasing
since 2002 and are likely to grow as more developing countries put in
place policies that create demand for such technologies. Any proposed
solution to address technology transfer must consider a way for the
least developed and developing countries to be able to lower tariffs for
selected technological products coming from other developing
countries without having to comply with MFN obligations under the
WTO.

49

Copenhagen Economics and the IPR Company, supra note 46; see also
John Barton, Intellectual Property and Access to Clean Energy Technologies in
Developing Countries: An Analysis of Solar Photovoltaic, Biofuel and Wind
Technologies (ICTSD Trade and Sustainable Energy Series, Issue Paper No. 2,
Dec. 2007).
48
INT’L ENERGY AGENCY, supra note 40, at 573.
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This need for emerging economies to provide technologies
cheaply to other developing countries is even clearer when it comes to
technologies for adaptation. LDCs and most developing countries are
probably the most vulnerable to extreme weather events (droughts and
floods) and shifts in disease bands that the IPCC Fourth Assessment
report has found to be some of the near term effects of climate
change.49 This resonates in particular areas, such as agriculture and
health. To become more climate-resilient, improving health systems
and access to appropriate diagnostic and treatment options for
diseases, such as malaria and dengue fever will be crucial. Dealing
with droughts and floods will require appropriately engineered or
hybridized plants and plant varieties. Health and agriculture are both
sectors that are heavily reliant on intellectual property as a way of
organizing investment, production and distribution. These
technologies are more likely to be IP protected not only in emerging
economies but also in a significant number of LDCs and developing
countries. This would make it more difficult to export products from
major emerging economies to LDCs and developing countries because
licenses are likely available only for domestic production and
distribution. Where these technologies are patented in LDCs and
developing countries, importing them becomes even more difficult.
Thus, a significant portion of LDCs and developing countries realize
that the best way to ensure access to technologies for adaptation in
areas, such as health and agriculture, is to reduce the number of patents
protected technologies in all developing countries, including emerging
economies.
Any proposed solutions must address this issue of generating
markets in developing countries, creating capacity and interest in
LDCs specifically, as well as enabling major emerging economies to
export technological products to developing countries, if not to major
developed economies. This may require some regulatory mechanisms
for segmenting international technology markets and increasing the
participation of private sector actors in major developing economies,
such as India and China.
Solutions must also address the issue of the scale and scope of
existing market measures and the need for enabling industrial policy
INT’L GOV. PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE (IPCC), CLIMATE CHANGE
2007: SYNTHESIS REPORT 48 (2008), available at
http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar4/syr/ar4_syr.pdf.
49
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measures related to intellectual property. This requires the UNFCCC
or some other relevant body to take a significant role in facilitating
transactions, reducing transaction costs and expanding markets. Such
policy interventions should be addressed at decreasing transaction
costs of developing country buyers in accessing the international
knowledge market, as well as international rightsholders when making
their knowledge and technologies available to developing country
actors, especially in emerging economies. By reducing the cost of
acquiring technological knowledge or absorbing existing technologies,
these interventions will, in turn, increase capacity and incentives for
domestic innovation,50 and encourage and enabling trade in products
and knowledge between emerging economies and other developing
countries, especially LDCs.
Finally, all of the above suggests that the near-term emergency
focuses primarily on rapidly increasing the distribution of existing and
near-commerce ready technologies. In the traditional intellectual
property sense, we need to focus on static efficiency i.e. distribution of
existing technology rather than dynamic efficiency, the generation of
new technologies. Any proposed solution to the intellectual property
issue needs to address both but we may have to delink dynamic
efficiency from static efficiency in the near term, but especially in the
2025-timeframe. From a global welfare perspective, deployment and
diffusion of technology to developing countries may also be the
cheapest and most effective way of ensuring GHG reductions,
especially in the 2015 – 2050 period. Some forecasting models
conclude that the learning process and speed of adoption and
deployment would be faster and cheaper in developing countries than
in OECD countries, suggesting that developing countries should be
preferred targets for investments in clean energy deployment and
diffusion.51 However, the attractiveness and success of such
deployments is complicated by the role of institutional frameworks
that may affect the certainty of investments such as the existence,
enforcement and predictability of intellectual property protection.52
50

See Bernard M. Hoekman et al., Transfer of Technology to
Developing Countries: Unilateral and Multilateral Policy Options 16 (World
Bank Policy Research, Working Paper No. 3332, 2004).
51
NICOLAS LEFEVRE, DEPLOYING CLIMATE-FRIENDLY TECHNOLOGIES
THROUGH COLLABORATION WITH DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 24 (2005). This
is especially true for solar PV. Id. at 25.
52
Id. at 32.
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Thus any approach that seeks to encourage such deployment using
market based incentives will have to find a way to address such
potential risk premiums in technology deployment while providing
incentives and mechanisms for industrialized country private actors to
deploy their technologies in developing countries.
There remains some debate about whether the technology mix
needed to address the scale of the climate challenge can be met with
already existing, deployed and demonstration-ready technologies or
whether new breakthrough technologies will be required. This is a
key issue as it will determine the extent to which the balance of
resources is directed toward R&D versus demonstration, deployment
and diffusion. However, the IPCC Third Assessment Report (2001)
argued that existing and demonstration-ready technology would be
sufficient. The Fourth Assessment report confirmed that conclusion
with high confidence from an overview of the range of scenarios for
stabilization.53 The Stern Report suggested that it was possible to meet
the climate change challenge using existing technologies,54 although
the report does state that achieving stabilization at 450 ppm, which is
consistent with a 1.5 – 2 degree Celsius goal is not likely to be
achievable with current and foreseeable technologies.55 Pacala and
Sokolow have argued with more confidence that, generally speaking
existing technologies would be sufficient.56 Arguing the contrary,
Hoffman et al. suggested in 2002 that existing technologies would be
insufficient and that new breakthroughs would be required.57 As the
assessments suggest that faster and greater reduction will be needed to
meet the challenge of reducing GHG emissions by 80% by 2050, the
arguments of those suggesting that new breakthroughs will be
necessary begin to seem increasingly persuasive. Taking into account
that the necessary reductions suggest that a peak of emissions will have
to take place between 2015 and 2025,58 the rapid deployment of
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CLIMATE CHANGE 2007, supra note 51, at 56.
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Martin I. Hoffert et al., Advanced Technology Paths to Global Climate
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existing technologies will be a prerequisite for longer term action. In
the longer term, technological breakthroughs may be required.
From an intellectual property perspective and the continual
argument between ensuring static efficiency (access to and distribution
of technology in the present) and dynamic efficiency (incentives for
the generation and diffusion of technologies in the future), static
efficiency must be the paramount concern with respect to existing
technologies in order to peak between 2015 and 2025. However, to
ensure that new technological breakthroughs are encouraged in the
2018 – 2050 period, dynamic efficiency must be paramount to ensure
the highest possible incentives for the creation of new technologies
that will contribute to GHG reduction. A consequence of this is that it
may be necessary to differentiate between providing little or no IP
protection for existing technologies, while ensuring sufficiently high
levels for those technologies already in the R&D pipeline.
Finally, any solution must address the elephant in the room,
which is how to get market actors in developed countries to engage in
transactions in developing countries given the uncertainties around
governance, legal recourse, and intellectual property protection. This
is at the core of the argument by developed countries that developing
countries need to create environments that enable technology transfer.
However, few developing countries are likely to be able to accomplish
such policy measures on their own and such measures are unlikely to
actually encourage technology transfer at the necessary scale. Any
solution must produce structures to achieve the goals of increasing
technology transfer while providing developed countries private sector
actors with reassurance. This means creating supranational
mechanisms that generate legal certainty. The next two sections
provide proposals that meet all of these criteria and which work in the
aggregate. Section III focuses on market-based facilitation of
transactions and Section IV proposes an IP moratorium that
emphasizes static efficiency in the near term while maintaining
incentives for innovation in the post-2025 period.
II.

59

REDUCING TRANSACTIONS COSTS AND CREATING
MARKETS IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES59

Some of these proposals have been included in a submission to the
Technology Executive Committee by the Climate Action Network’s Working
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A significant part of the problem for technology transfer for
climate change relates to the nature and scale of transactions for both
product and knowledge. One of the contributions that the UNFCCC
or other international climate institutions can make is to provide
standardized, centralized and trustworthy mechanisms for negotiating
and carrying out such transactions. A crucial part of this will be
providing transparency, certainty, predictability, and conflict
resolution.
A. Mechanisms for Reducing Transaction costs
1. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY EXCHANGE AND PLATFORM
The UNFCCC should authorize and create an intellectual property
exchange specifically for climate change mitigation and adaptation
technologies. Such an exchange would enable secure, efficient and
transparent arms-length transactions for intellectual property licensing
at a one-stop shop, with the weight and authority of the UNFCCC
behind it. It may be appropriate to select one or more existing
exchanges in an open and competitive process provided that the
selected exchange meets basic criteria. Such baseline attributes include
providing a low flat nominal fee for those posting assets or seeking to
access licenses and enabling special licensing arrangements for LDCs
in addition to security and predictable dispute resolution features.
Such exchanges make the process of identifying licensees,
technologies on offer and carrying out negotiations and pricing much
easier and simpler, including standard licensing. They are particularly
useful for those institutions and firms that are primarily engaged in
manufacturing their activities and for whom licensing is not a central
activity. The opportunity costs related to negotiating and licensing out
are much reduced in such an exchange for such actors who may not be
willing to put significant resources into licensing activity. The
exchanges may also be very useful for weakly resourced institutions
and actors, such as university technology transfer offices. A pilot
version of such an exchange for environmentally sound technologies
was Green Xchange, which was established in 2009 as a collaboration
Group on Technology available at:
https://unfccc.int/ttclear/pdf/Call%20for%20Inputs/EE/CAN_EE.pdf.
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of Creative Commons and several firms, to implement a patent
commons approach first pioneered by Creative Commons in the
copyright arena and extended now to the field of patents. Green
Xchange offered four kinds of standard licenses: Intellectual capital
which provided free and open access to all for any purposes; Research
Non-exempt which is limited to free access for non-profits for noncommercial research purposes only (patenting for non-commercial
purposes is also allowed); Standard which provided a royalty free
license for exploitation for commercial purposes; and Standard PLUS
which required some payments and could contain other term
restrictions. Assessment of the project suggests that it never expanded
much beyond the primary provider of the initial patents, Nike, and that
the business model was never able to overcome issues related to
existing IP management practices in firms who primarily viewed IP as
a strategic blocking tool.60 The Xchange was never able to build up a
critical mass of patents; it also found that users were primarily
interested not just in the patent, but in the associated know-how
requiring further building up of relationships and value-added service
that the exchange was not in a position to provide.61 In addition, while
the focus on open innovation was laudable, it made it difficult to make
a business case to firms that they should place their patents into the
Xchange. This may have made the Xchange more of a CSR exercise
for many companies rather than a new business opportunity. In this
case of this proposal, the presence of the CTC&N in combination with
the exchange, as well as access to financing and a critical mass due to
the worldwide scale of the exchange would go a long way to
addressing some of the challenges encountered by the Green Xchange
approach.
2. A B2B PLATFORM FOR COMMERCIAL TRANSACTIONS
In parallel, The UNFCCC should also designate a B2B platform
for commercial transactions related to climate change mitigation and
adaptation products and goods, specifically targeted at projects and
See ROYA GHAFELE & ROBERT D. O’BRIEN, OPEN INNOVATION FOR
SUSTAINABILITY: LESSONS FROM THE GREENXCHANGE EXPERIENCE,
INTERNATIONAL CENTRE FOR TRADE AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT
POLICY BRIEF NO. 13 (June 2012), at 5.
61
Id. at 1-8.
60
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programs funded by UNFCCC financial mechanisms that leverages
the information and categorization achieved by the Climate
Technology Center & Network (“CTC&N”) and its affiliated
databases to allow easy access to publicly available technologies in
particular. Such a platform would enable global, transparent offers for
sale and offers for purchasing of technological goods and services on
a web-based platform and enable secure, efficient arms-length
transactions without long protracted negotiation processes.
Registration requirements and placing of financial bonds for
participation would reduce transaction risks for sellers and buyers, as
would processes for reputational ranking. It may be appropriate for
the UNFCCC to select, through an open tender process for the
development, implementation and running of such a platform that
would be funded by a basic fee for participation charged to private
stakeholders. The CTC&N may be an appropriate host for the B2B
platform.
3. AN INTERNATIONAL IP ARBITRATION MECHANISM
Finally, the UNFCCC should authorize, designate or create an
Arbitration Mechanism to address contractual or intellectual property
licensing problems that arise in the context of any legal dispute related
to projects or programs funded by any UNFCCC Financial
Mechanism.
Receipt of funds from any UNFCCC financial
mechanism and use of such in any contract using, accepting or in any
way transferring intellectual property, should be contingent on
acceptance of a mandatory arbitration clause in the funding contract
and in the contract between the funding recipient and the technology
provider (subject to the participants’ choice of law in each contract and
the designated countries’ system for recognition of mandatory
arbitration terms). All UNFCCC countries would have to agree to
implement such decisions, subject only to the Constitutional
requirements of domestic law either by joining and committing to
apply principles of the New York Convention on the Recognition and
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards.62 Decisions of the
62

NEW YORK ARBITRATION CONVENTION, NEW YORK ARBITRATION
CONVENTION ON THE RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN ARBITRAL
AWARDS, (June 10, 1958),
http://www.newyorkconvention.org/new+york+convention+texts.
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Arbitration mechanism would be appealable to the Advisory Board of
the Technology Mechanism (which is composed of member state
representatives, which will review and only reverse such decisions by
a two-thirds majority of the voting members). Existing mechanisms,
such as the WIPO Arbitration and Mediation Center, may be
appropriate designees as such a mechanism.
4. ENABLING
JOINT
RESEARCH
DEMONSTRATION AND DEPLOYMENT

&

DEVELOPMENT,

Collaborative R&D is seen by many as a way to circumvent IPrelated issues by engaging in joint research in structures that provide
for the sharing of IP.63 Thus joint cross-border R&D will ensure that
all involved parties have ownership. Studies have shown that
investment in R&D has a significant impact on technology
productivity and capacity building and can be a powerful tool in
enabling not just deployment but capacity to adopt and adapt
technologies to local needs.64 This may be based on the CGIAR model
of sector-specific directed research groups. This can allow pooling of
resources by governments rather than creating competing research
programs. Joint Demonstration R&D platforms have been suggested
by others as a way to address especially problems related to the
commercialization, and uptake of climate technologies.65
Providing equal access to R&D subsidies and funds to firms
from developing countries is a crucial way to encourage technology
transfer. Since the expiration of the provisions in the Agreement on
Subsidies and Countervailing Measures66 on non-actionable subsidies
63

BERNICE LEE ET AL., WHO OWNS OUR LOW CARBON FUTURE?
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND ENERGY TECHNOLOGIES 59 (Chatham House
ed., 2009). See also, DAVID OCKWELL ET AL., UK-INDIA COLLABORATION TO
IDENTIFY THE BARRIERS TO THE TRANSFER OF LOW CARBON TECHNOLOGY,
FINAL REPORT 110 (Department of Environment, Food and Rural Affairs, ed.,
2007).
64
See BERNARD M. HOEKMAN ET AL., TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY TO
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: UNILATERAL AND MULTILATERAL POLICY OPTIONS
8 (World Bank Policy Research, Working Paper No. 3332, 2004).
65
See LEE ET AL., supra note 66, at 61.
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Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Apr. 15,
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization,
Annex 1A, 1869 U.N.T.S. 14.
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on 31 December 1999, environmental subsidies generally, and
research and development subsidies specifically fall within the
category of ‘actionable’ subsidies. Thus, discriminatory R&D subsidy
regimes by industrialized countries may be subject to WTO dispute
settlement if they do not meet the standards in Articles 1, 2 and 5 of
the SCM Agreement. However, it may be better to address such issues
with prior commitments to provide access negotiated at the UNFCCC.
The use of tax benefits for R&D could be extended to R&D carried out
in developing countries, especially for LDCs.
The IEA Technology Implementing Agreements may be an
appropriate way in which to address the need for increasing
international R&D collaboration. These implementing agreements
serve as vehicles for directed collaboration with defined roadmaps and
research and development goals in which countries participate
voluntarily, and which may include both IEA member and nonmember countries as well as associated parties from industry and
academia.67 The IEA has established a cross-cutting TIA called the
Climate Technology Initiative. However, unlike some of the TIAs it
has no explicit research component primarily focusing on information
sharing and description of best practices.
A key component of many of these TIAs is that they envision
either a cost-sharing framework, with a contribution from each
participating party or a task-sharing framework, in which each party
takes on a task and pays the costs of that itself within its own national
framework.68 It is not clear whether this is the main cause for the
limited participation of developing country parties or private sector
actors from developing countries in these TIAs, but a survey of the
membership of all forty current TIAs shows low participation of
developing countries.69 In addition, the issue of intellectual property
is structured in such as fashion as to assure right holders that any IP
that they make available as part of the project will not be disclosed or
transferred to others.70 What is done with the information and possibly
patentable improvements that may occur as a result of the
INT’L ENERGY AGENCY, ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION
AND DEVELOPMENT, IEA IMPLEMENTING AGREEMENTS: BACKGROUND AND
FRAMEWORK AS OF 2003 3 (2003), https://www.solarpaces.org/wp67

content/uploads/IA_Framework_ia-brochure2003.pdf.
68
Id. at 5, 11.
69
Id.
70
Id. at 6.
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collaborations is also unclear. The major problem is that the TIAs
focus almost exclusively on information-sharing arrangements such as
workshops and platforms or collecting and describing best practices
but rarely involve carrying out proof of concept or demonstration
projects.71
If the IEA aims to become a useful venue for reducing IP issues
while enhancing R&D collaboration it will need to take three critical
steps. These include finding a financing structure that appeals to the
participation of developing countries, by perhaps applying for GCF
funds to enable participation, clarifying IP sharing of technologies
developed under the TIAs, and focusing on tangible cooperation
regarding proof of concept, demonstration and adaptation of
technologies to specific conditions and markets.
If we take to heart the argument that the primary need in
developing countries is for technologies that are either new to the
domestic industry or new to the domestic firm, but not necessarily
inventive72, then the focus should be on dissemination of existing
technologies in the near term. Collaborative R&D will be useful for
avoiding IP problems once developing countries have built up
sufficient domestic capacity to compete on the global market in these
sectors and this may already be true in some sectors such as wind and
solar PV. Thus R&D per se is best suited for the post-2030
technological landscape and not a panacea for the short-term problems
of access to advanced but already commercialized products and
processes. What is needed is the demonstration and adaptation of
commercialized or near commercialization technologies to market and
environmental factors in developing countries. The TIAs may be
better suited to creating the breakthrough technologies of the future
post-2030, but less well-suited to enabling work directed at near-term
demonstration and deployment of already commercialized or near
commercialized technologies.
The establishment of global voluntary patent pools is another
conflict avoidance strategy that has been proposed.73 Global voluntary
71

OCKWELL ET AL., supra note 66, at 113.
David Ockwell et al., Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development, OECD Environment Working Papers 12, Enhancing
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patent pools consist of right holders placing technologies in exchange
pools where right holders are able to access other’s technologies, the
know-how, and the capacity building to make the most effective use
of these other technologies. To further avoid conflict, parties could
place technologies and know-how in the public domain to make them
readily accessible. There are several weaknesses to global patent pools,
and I am more skeptical of these than authors such as Maskus.74 Pools
are only as effective as their memberships, their content and the
licensing structure that they create. The first concern would be to
ensure that the pool was open to all relevant actors and did not unduly
exclude firms from developing countries. Where the establishment of
these is voluntary, it may be possible to rely on market forces to best
identify the stakeholders. Where it is government structured or
mandated, the difficulty lies in designing a system that would be seen
as fair by both insiders and outsiders. In both cases, significant
concerns arise about anti-competitive effects. A patent pool is most
efficient where it brings together sets of different, complementary
technologies that in the aggregate provide a package that allows the
manufacture of a product. One example could be the smartphone
market.75 Many patents from so many different partners on different
aspects of the technology are necessary for the product to be created.
It is more efficient to allow all participants to pool their patents,
allowing easy or cheap access for all participants to the package.
However, where the pool charges higher prices for accessing the
technology than to its own members, this creates a barrier to entry in
the product market. Thus incumbents may be unduly protected. Where
the pool consists not just of complementary technology which may be
linked in some network but of companies with similar technologies
and patents, the anti-competitive concerns are that much larger, as this
allows the firms to only prevent entry into the product market, but also
allows them to collude to charge a joint higher price in the licensing
market. Thus where these licensors might have competed on price and
terms, they can now present the same, likely higher costs and terms to
non-pool members. What is problematic is that much of what people
envision pools achieving in the realm of climate technology is the
74

See Keith Maskus, Differentiated Intellectual Property Regimes for
Environmental and Climate Technologies 27 (OECD Environment Working
Papers, Working Paper No. 17, 2010).
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pooling of similar technologies, allowing firms to more efficiently
research and improve each other’s technologies.76 Such patent pools
seem to be viewed as tools for accessing technologies for firms in
developing countries, but where these firms are not able to provide
sufficiently valuable patents to the pool, there will be no market
incentive to include them in the pool. In either case, voluntary pools
pose too much of a danger in competitive terms in that they are likely
to exclude developing country firms, and that they are unlikely to
allow competitors to share technologies. Where the package of patents
offered by the pool contains non-essential patents, but the pool uses
the leverage to require purchase of these as part of the package, this
also creates significant problems for the market.
It is important to consider the kind of problems that pools are
meant to solve. If the issue is one where production of a technological
good is blocked because of patent thickets and high transaction costs,
voluntary or even publicly backed pools can be useful tools. They can
provide a one stop shop for all participants in the product market. If
the issue is to try to solve the issue of such things as refusals to license,
or reluctance to share technology and knowledge, voluntary pools are
not likely to change the behavior of those firms who see the patent
primarily as a tool for creating room to operate and prevent market
entry, unless they can use the pool to exclude new market entrants. As
noted, given the gaps in ownership in patenting between firms in
developed and developing countries, cross-licensing within a pool
creates little inactive for the inclusion of firms in developing countries
without valuable IP. They would most likely end up as outsiders to
the pool. In designing around this, what is actually being created is the
concept of a repository, from which stakeholders can pick and choose
which technologies they wish to license at a flat rate. Given the
variation in the utility and value of different patents, such a repository
is unlikely to be able to provide a flat rate and each patent will have to
be priced differently. This effectively then becomes a publicly run IP
licensing platform rather than a pool per se. Thus, while the idea of
aggregation is correct, both the “patent pool” label and a understanding
of the limits of aggregation are sometimes lacking from

76

See LEE ET AL., supra note 66, at 59.
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recommendations to pool patents, enable cross-licensing, and provide
low-cost access.
The limits of joint R&D unaccompanied by deliberate and
structured training, education and capacity building for the majority of
developing countries are clear. The UNFCCC needs to leverage its
institutional and financial power to retain some power of how and what
it licenses and focus its work on demonstration and deployment,
allowing the bulk of breakthrough research to take place in the IEA
and other fora.
With that in mind, I propose that the UNFCCC should require
that all R&D projects funded by any UNFCCC financial mechanism
establish joint intellectual property rights for the UNFCCC, through
the TEC and/or CTCN as its authorized representative. The TEC
and/or CTCN should not require permission from other joint right
holders to license the technology, at grant or concessional rates and
terms, with proceeds shared jointly with other right holders, to
enterprises and institutions located in LDCs or other countries with
insufficient technological and manufacturing capacity if it meets
certain criteria. The enterprise or institution must be located within the
territory of an LDC or other countries with insufficient technological
and manufacturing capacity and committed to carrying out activities
related to adaptation, demonstration, and deployment of
commercialized, or near commercialized technologies in the country
for at least 5 years as well as capacity building, education, information
transfer, and training of local personnel relating to the licensed
technology.
As a condition of receiving funds, all R&D demonstration and
deployment projects with a funding component from any UNFCCC
Financial Mechanism, must involve at least one public research
institution from an LDC and, at the very least, intellectual property
rights in technologies and knowledge developed under the research
project or program so funded must be vested jointly in that public
institution. Industrialized country parties should commit to giving
preference for any publicly funded research collaborations on climate
technology to those that include participation by public and/or
academic institutions from developing countries. This would have, for
example, required that the EU Horizon 2020 research funding
framework program currently in force, give preference to projects in
the climate mitigation and adaptation sector, to those that include
public institutions from developing countries.
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5. ENABLING ACCESS TO PUBLICLY FUNDED TECHNOLOGIES
There is a need in industrialized countries for a clear policy
focus on ensuring that publicly funded technologies are made available
at grant or concessional rates on a non-exclusive basis to firms and
institutions in developing countries. This needs to go beyond the nonprofit Model licenses made available by, for example, the US National
Institutes of Health (“NIH”).77 This would require that funding
agencies maintain ownership or retain non-exclusive licenses, with the
option of sub-licensing on a non-exclusive basis and geographically
limited to developing countries, on a grant or concessional basis.
With that in mind I propose that UNFCCC industrialized
country parties commit to retaining the IP right or full non-exclusive
licensing rights to publicly funded technologies and commit to license
or sub-license technologies developed using public funds to firms and
institutions in developing countries, or to the CTC&N and related joint
R&D platforms, on non-exclusive grant or concessional terms. It may
be appropriate to limit these licenses to domestic use and for export of
products, or products produced by protected processes, only to other
developing countries.
The majority of these licenses are likely to consist of precommercialization technologies closer to basic science and research.
In such situations, firms in developing countries may not be likely to
take these technologies up on their own but may be in a position to do
so where they are carried out in sectoral-based public-private
partnerships78 or in the context of broader international R&D
programs. These will require funding for proof of concept and
demonstration. The ability to provide geographical limitations may
make it more likely that developed country agencies will engage in
such licensing, given an appropriate licensing partner or platform.
77
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B. Market Access and Creation Mechanisms
A key set of needs relate to market access for products
produced by specific processes. This market access can be envisioned
as a two-way flow: moving technological products into LDCs and
other countries with little or no manufacturing capacity, and
encouraging location of manufacturing and other activities such as
R&D in LDCs to encourage skills training and transfer of know-how
to institutions and firms in developing countries. The aim would be to
use the leverage of financing by the UNFCCC, largely through the
Green Climate Fund and with the assistance of the CTC&N, to provide
an incentive for developing country and industrialized country firms
to participate.
Industrialized countries can use the proposed mechanism as a
lever to enable and encourage technological development in
developing and least developed countries. They could specifically and
unilaterally open their markets, by lowering their tariffs on
environmentally sound technologies produced by developing
countries, especially by low and middle income countries.79 While this
could be done unilaterally, the aim would be to leverage the funding
capacity of the UNFCCC to encourage and model the behavior. The
proposal is to have a COP decision or set of decisions that would create
a standard model license to be used by firms and institutions in
developing country UNFCCC parties to produce technologies
primarily for their domestic markets and for export to LDC markets or
other countries with insufficient technological and manufacturing
capacity. The license would explicitly exclude the export of patented
products or products produced by a patented process into other nonLDC or non-developing country markets. Recipients of funds from
any UNFCCC financial mechanism who used such a license would be
prioritized for receipt of funds and would be guaranteed 100% support
of licensing costs, even at full commercial rates. Funds for licensing
of technologies covered by such a license would have to meet one or
more of the following criteria: (1)the technology would be effective at
increasing energy access for the most vulnerable; (2)the technology
would be effective at enabling specific adaptation to a climate change
risk or effect to which LDCs are particularly vulnerable; or (3) the
79
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technology would be effective at increasing the adaptive capacity of
vulnerable populations in all developing countries.
Additionally COP should create a standard model license to
allow enterprises from any UNFCCC party to export technological
goods produced in any LDC into any other UNFCCC party where the
products or process producing such products is IP protected if
production of the technology and/or application of the process for
production is carried out in facilities located within the territory of an
LDC and is committed to do so for at least 10 years. Additionally, at
least 30% of personnel involved each year in production shall be local
citizens; production shall include capacity building, and at least one
sub-license shall be granted, at grant or concessional rates, for use of
the technology for production and/or adaptation primarily for the
domestic market of the LDC.
For those LDCs where a specific technology product or process
is not IP protected, UNFCCC parties should commit to allow import
at 0% tariff into other UNFCCC countries of that technological
product, or products produced by that process, made in LDCs
capacity), provided that production of the technology or application of
the process for production is carried out in facilities located within the
territory of an LDC and is committed to do so for at least 5 years.
Recipients of any UNFCCC Financial mechanism who carried out
such production would be prioritized for receipt of funds.
The model licenses are targeted at two groups. The first is at
emerging economy firms who may need incentives to take on such
licenses with such restrictions and to encourage them to focus on LDCs
and other developing countries as prime markets and launch pads for
their products. It also removes the LDCs and smaller developing
countries from the arena of competition between emerging economy
firms and industrialized country firms. To the extent that emerging
economy firms wish to have access to industrialized country markets
they can compete on the international global field directly, or they can
go through LDCs. This allows for LDCs to benefit both from the
employment and technology transfer from emerging economies but to
also benefit from the market access into industrialized economies.
While many already enjoy significant tariff free access for their goods
into industrialized economies under various preferential regimes (e.g.
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the Everything But Arms initiative of the European Union)80 these do
not extend to IP protected goods or goods produced by an IP protected
process, and many are bound by restrictive standards on rules of origin
that limit the ability of firms from other countries to use their location
in LDCs to also benefit from such access. This proposed system
piggybacks on this existing framework but requires some more
flexibility in terms of rules of origin but strict standards in terms of
technology transfer and benefit to the LDC.
III.

A PRAGMATICALLY RADICAL PROPOSAL – MORATORIUM
TO PEAK DATE

The data and scenarios tend to agree that peaking somewhere
between 2015 and 2025 will be required if we are to stand a reasonable
chance of reducing emissions by 80% by 2050 (relative to 2007 levels)
and to stabilize at an increase of only 1.5-2 degrees Celsius.81 There
is significant evidence and consensus that peaking can be achieved
with existing or near commercialization technologies.82 Peaking
however, can only be achieved with a rapid uptake of existing
technology at a rate unprecedented in human history. The need for
rapid distribution of technological products is clearly paramount and
economies of scale have to be achieved in a very short period of time.
The immediate availability of more efficient and low emission
processes in all fields is crucial to shifting industries away from GHGreliant paths, and to preventing lock-in. Existing methods of ensuring
deployment and diffusion of technology are likely to be insufficient.83
The process of licensing negotiations or other bilateral exchanges
between rightholders and users of their technologies are too slow.
While the facilitative mechanisms outlined above present serious
attempts to reduce transaction costs, what we need is an almost
frictionless system. However, we may also need to address the issue
of certainty by not making unduly permanent changes in the
innovation system, especially if we wish to maintain the dynamic
80
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efficiencies and production of new technologies in the post-2025
period after peaking. As noted, adaptive capacity must also be built
up as quickly as possible in the near term to ensure increased
survivability in the post-peak period, when changes of at least 1 degree
Celsius appear to be already locked-in.84
It is also important in a world in which complex technologies
consist of multiple patents that the focus in on increasing the capacity
to access, use, and adapt products rather than specific patented
components. The solutions proposed must operate at the level of the
product, not just at the one or more technological inventions contained
within a product. With respect to processes, the need is to address
products produced by such processes and to the specific technologies
that enable process change or efficiency, which are more likely
embedded in the single patent or technology. What this means is that
actions aimed at these technologies are not likely to have 100%
congruence with specific patent classifications. The scope and effect
of action will therefore be limited only to those situations wherein a
patent (product or process) is being used for a particular designated
climate technological purpose. This is an important distinction for the
proposal I make below, so that patent holders will still remain free to
address those activities that are not associated with the specific sectors
or products identified below.
With these conditions in mind I propose the following two elements
for a UNFCCC Agreement.
A. A 2015 - 2025 Moratorium On IP Enforcement
A moratorium on IP Enforcement in all UNFCCC members of
patents, plant breeders’ rights, copyright and trade secrets rights
embedded, contained in, or consisting of technological products and
processes for climate change mitigation and adaptation and which
were applied for, or came into existence, prior to January 1, 2020. All
actors in all UNFCCC member countries would be allowed to exercise
all activities in respect of the protected right, for the period of the
moratorium.
This would also entail a suspension of the term on the right,
which would not run during the moratorium. After the end of the
moratorium, the rightholder and the state could resume enforcement
84
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and the term would begin to run again but the right would only exist
against those who began to make use of the protected technology after
the end of the moratorium. All prior users could continue to rely on
the use that they had made of the protected technology during the
moratorium.
Under the agreement, the patent holder could also elect to
establish a liability regime85 for the technology in which ALL prior
and new users of the protected technology would continue to be
allowed to exercise activities with respect to the sectors defined below
but would be required to pay a flat fee or percentage of reported profits.
Thus there would be no right of refusal but a right of remuneration. In
each jurisdiction where the IP protection remained in force, the country
would designate a state agency which would be obligated to enforce
and collect the fee on behalf of, and in partnership with, the patent
holder. The fee would be set up by a negotiated agreement between
the rightholder, the agency and representatives of user stakeholders. If
no agreement was reached within a year of the moratorium ending, the
fee would be subjected to binding arbitration86, which would take into
account: the need to ensure reasonable;87the national domestic market;
and the need to not deter continued use of the technologies.
Such a moratorium would apply in a large variety of fields.88 In the
area of health, it would encompass medical products, processes and
services related to managing health needs during extreme weather
events, increasing general immune-capacity and resistance to vector
borne and temperature sensitive diseases, creating hygienic and
sanitary living and working conditions and WHO essential medicines,
89
and associated medical devices and diagnostic tools such as anti-
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protozoals,90 disinfectants and antiseptics,91 gastrointestinal
medicines,92 immunicologicals,93 and antibacterials. 94
New plant and animal varieties or adaptations and wider use of
existing plant and animal varieties may be required in areas where
hydrological and seasonal variations go beyond those under which
existing seed and animal germplasm input strategies were developed.
Biotechnology and animal and plant breeding will play significant
roles in adaptation responses, especially where shifts in management
practices and behavior are insufficient to achieve the full scale of
adaptation needed.95 Working from several sources96 such as the
CGIAR and the ITPGRFA, and focus on those technologies related to
core staple foods, as well as, we can already identify a limited list
including seeds of plant varieties, especially wheat, soya, maize, rice,
sorghum, sugar cane, with resistance to drought, flood, salt-water or
pest and disease resistance, response to fertilizer or long and short
harvest cycles,97animal germplasm and animal varieties with shorter
reproductive cycles capable of surviving drought, flood or disease or
less likely to produce methane during digestion;98 biotechnological
and other methods for producing such plants or varieties; low cost and
low GHG-emissions fertilizers or pest management chemicals and
systems for the management of animal waste, including recycling into
biogas and other biomass for energy generation.
Efficient water use or monitoring, storage, capture, treatment and
reclamation technologies for desalination99 or the treatment of high
90
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levels of toxicity and microbial growth;100 extreme weather event
capacity and response systems including early warning systems,
stockpiling and distribution systems, disaster mitigation systems and
weather resistant materials; renewable energy generation and end use
fuel or electrical efficiency systems, industry process efficiencies
including in the production of iron and steel,101 cement,102 chemicals
and petrochemicals,103 paper,104 and aluminum;105 as well as
vehicular106 and structural power and heating sources107 and fuel
efficiency all will require similar assessment and treatment.
B. Phase to Zero Tariff 2025
On the goods and services identified above, including those
that are protected by intellectual property rights, or produced by
processes that are protected by intellectual property rights (other than
trademarks), industrialized countries (Annex 1 countries) agree to
immediately lower their effective (not WTO bound) tariffs to zero,
beginning in 2015. They also agree to allow importation of
technologies into their economies. Emerging economies, in particular
Brazil, India, and China (but above a defined GDP per capita
threshold), all agree to lower their effective tariffs to zero, phasing in
20% reductions per annum from existing levels by 2020. All other
countries agree to lower their effective tariffs on goods by 2025.
While the agreement in the UNFCCC involves tariffs, the
agreement to reduce tariffs will not be in violation of the WTO
Agreement because it does not violate the national treatment (Article
III GATT 1947) or the MFN requirement (Article I GATT 1947). It
100
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does not raise tariffs, nor does it give preferential treatment to any
party.
The combination of these two elements is aimed at removing
primary barriers related to regulations and tariffs to access and
adoption of technologies. This does not, of course, fully address the
capacity and financing issues, but the aim is that the proposal will
function as a shock to the system pushing adoption of climate
technologies for adaptation and mitigation to the fore. The time limit
will accomplish two things: create an incentive for those who wish to
adopt such technologies to do so as quickly as possible within the
moratorium window; allow rightholders to maintain ownership and
still have a mechanism for recouping investments and making money
from their IP after the moratorium is ended. Specifically, it shifts the
business model for rightholders to one where they can expect to
receive many smaller payments but from a hugely expanded
population of users. The length of the term of their right is not
diminished by this proposal but it is simply suspended for the period
necessary to ensure maximum dissemination of all technologies during
the period to peaking. This will ensure that the best available
technologies will be adopted in that period rather than the cheapest
available, but second-best options. The proposal takes what has been
one of the more radical proposals on the table, the proposal from the
G77 to remove patent protection for all environmentally sound
technologies in developing countries108 and modifies it to actually
achieve a very specific time limited goal that takes into account both
static and dynamic efficiency in the production and dissemination of
climate related technological public goods. The proposal for a
moratorium on IP enforcement makes no distinction between
industrialized and developing countries given the urgent need for
global deployment and for addressing transaction friction in
industrialized countries as well. However, one can imagine several
options that could differentiate and be more specifically targeted. One
108
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possibility would be that the moratorium in full would only apply to
developing countries, while industrialized countries would only apply
the moratorium on the right of importation. This would privilege those
products and products produced by such processes that came from
developing countries. Those in industrialized countries would still
have to receive permission from the rightholder. This would provide
a significant incentive for firms to relocate R&D, and production
facilities to developing countries for the period of the moratorium.
Another possibility would be to apply the phased approach in the
phased tariff part but in reverse. Thus industrialized countries would
have a moratorium for the period from 2020 to 2025, while developing
countries would have the moratorium from 2020 – 2030, thus having
a head start but not such an advantage that firms would relocate entire
lines of production and R&D. Clearly the core details of such an
agreement would have to be negotiated but the essential principle may
present a workable middle ground between existing negotiating
positions and the need to address climate change.
CONCLUSION
Climate change presents a radical challenge to existing
structures of production and consumption, and in particular to our
existing modes of decision-making and legal implementation. The
uncertainty does not just lie in the extent to which we must act to
mitigate and adapt to climate change but also in whether or not existing
regulations pose a barrier or create too much friction to enable action
to address climate change. In implementing solutions, there is always
the fear of doing more damage and creating new problems while trying
to solve another problem. There is also, however, the sense that
delayed action may make effective action at a later date extremely
costly or not possible at all. These uncertainties are complicated by
deep divisions between industrialized and developing countries on
burden sharing, on the scale and sources of financing, on the scale and
sources of technology transfer. Pragmatism requires that any workable
solution must balance between all of the competing demands and
uncertainties. The scale of the climate change problem however,
requires radical solutions that have broad impact. The proposal is a
demonstration proof that pragmatic radicalism in addressing climate
change is possible if, but only if, driven by a full assessment of the
scale of the problem, the time remaining to address it, the mechanisms
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best suited to enabling a solution (in the case of technology transfer
specifically), and the limits of existing regulatory rules. This
understanding is what tells us how far outside the existing framework
we may need to go and whether or not such changes need to be
permanent or time limited. There is clearly much more work to be
done to provide better information on which to base solutions,
especially in the arena of empirical evidence relating to the scale and
scope of technology transfer and the role of intellectual property.
What I have tried to show is that the response to this need not be to rip
the system up root and branch, but to target very specific mechanisms
which can be adjusted and made to work for rather than against
technology transfer through facilitation of transactions, elaboration of
existing obligations and judicious norm-setting.

